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I. INTRODUCTION
Is "old brown eyes" back? In the colorized version of the
thriller Suddenly, Frank Sinatra's famous eyes have gone from
blue to brown.1 Colorization is the process which results in the
computerized coloring of films that originally were produced in
black and white.2
The colorization process is essentially akin to painting by num-
bers, only with computer sophistication. A computer artist ini-
tially colors a single frame of a film assigning one of 50,000
available hues to each of the 525,000 pixels, or dots, that may
constitute any given frame. Once this frame has been colored,
the computer keeps track of each object as it moves from frame
to frame, but only until the scene changes. When a new scene
appears, the process must be repeated.3
The end result is a film that now has various colors where once
there were only black, white, and shades of grey.
Colorization has been criticized roundly by filmmakers, per-
formers, and critics for injecting unnatural and undesirable tones
1. G. Siskel, Siskel & Ebert, (Buena Vista, syndicated television program aired 5/2/87-
5/8/87) (transcript on file with the University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law
Review).
2. See Note, Artists' Moral Rights and Film Colorization: Federal Legislative Efforts
To Provide Visual Artists With Moral Rights And Resale Royalties, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV.
965, 984 n.134 (1987); COLOR SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1988).
3. Kohs, When Art and Commerce Collide: Colorization and the Moral Right, 18 J.
ARTS MGMT. & L. 13, 14 (Spring 1988). For this reason, the colorization process is painstak-
ingly slow-it sometimes takes several hours to complete just one minute of film.
1
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into images that were designed to take advantage of the effects of
light and shadow, and be viewed in black and white.4 For example,
in a colorized Yankee Doodle Dandy, the colors bleed as James
Cagney dances across the stage.5 Ginger Rogers, referring to her
appearance in a colorized film, said she was embarrassed to be
"painted up like a birthday cake."'6 Director Elliot Silverstein has
called the colorizing computer an "ingenious instrument of deface-
ment,"7 another way filmmakers' "children" are "tortured and
butchered." 8 Yet, despite intensive criticism, the colorization in-
dustry has grown at a phenomenal pace.' This growth has
4. See infra notes 32-35, and accompanying text.
5. G. Siskel, Siskel & Ebert, supra note 1.
6. Film Integrity Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 2400 Before the Subcomm. on Tech-
nology and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(statement of Ginger Rogers, film performer), reprinted in Colorization: The Arguments
Against, 17 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 79, 86 (Fall, 1987) [hereinafter Arguments Against].
7. Arguments Against, supra note 6, at 93 (statement of Elliott Silverstein, film direc-
tor, member of the Director's Guild of America).
8. Id. at 89. Movies are altered in other ways to make them suitable for broadcast
television, including speeding the film up and employing a method known as "panned and
scanned." Speeding up occurs when the film is transferred to tape; one or two frames per
second are dropped from the film and several minutes over the course of the film are created
for the insertion of commercials. "Panned and scanned" results from the difference in the
width of a frame size when transferring the film from the wide screen of movies to the
narrower screen of television. This method is achieved either by showing only one part of
the frame or by moving a scanner across the film showing different parts of a frame at
different moments. Silverstein states that this scanning process "imposes a rhythm, empha-
sis, movement and imagery foreign to the film makers idea." Id. at 89-90. Yet, normal pan-
ning and scanning and speeding up do not result in actionable copyright violation. Courts
have held that cutting or editing significant portions of a film or television program before
airing it is a violation of the original program producer's copyright. See WGN Broadcasting
Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982); Gilliam v. American Broadcast-
ing Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976). Colorization does not involve the editing or cutting
of any portion of the film; it merely involves adding color. But this is significant, for the
intangible portion of the film-the film's artistic message or impact-may be seriously dam-
aged by the addition of color. See generally infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text. For
example, in the original version of Frank Capra's It's A Wonderful Life (RKO Radio Pic-
tures 1942), the coldness and malevolent nature of Lionel Barrymore's banker character is
presented and emphasized by the stark contrast of the harsh light on his stone, white face
with the dark black of his suit and the background. Yet, in the colorized version of the film,
Barrymore's face apears a soft flesh color which serves to humanize his character and dimin-
ish the impact upon the viewer of his indifference. See G. Siskel, Siskel & Ebert, supra note
1.
9. Presently, there are two major firms in the colorization field: Colorization, Inc. of
Toronto, Canada and Color Systems Technology (Color Systems) of Marina del Rey, Cali-
fornia. Allen, Copyrights and Color Wrongs: Are Old Films Protected?, CAL. LAW., Apr.
1987, at 12. The growth in this field has been tremendous. In one year, 1986 through 1987,
revenues for Color Systems increased over 500%, from $846,000 to $5,207,000. COLOR SYS-
TEMS TECHNOLOGY, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. The colorizing firms merely have
skimmed the surface of the available film library. Buddy Young, the president of Color Sys-
tems, estimates that if output increased one-thousand percent there would still be twenty-
[Vol. 6:87
2
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presented serious questions about the way that United States law
offers artists protection for their work. This Comment proposes to
address some of these questions. Part I explains the process of
colorization and sets it in the background of the existing copyright
law; Part II offers a discussion of the protections available to cre-
ators under European laws and contrasts these with United States
laws; Part III discusses the protections that would have been avail-
able under the federal Film Protection Act, which was not
adopted; Part IV is the conclusion of this Comment.
A. Copyright
On June 19, 1987, the Library of Congress' Copyright Office
proposed that makers of colorized copies of black and white films
could file for copyright protection as derivative works.'0 This
means that the colorized film's creator receives a copyright in the
film entirely unique and separate from that of the original black
and white version. The colorizer need never seek permission of the
creator of the original before distributing, copying, exhibiting, or
otherwise reproducing the colorized copy, though it is the same
film-nothing has been altered but the tonal values." Under this
ruling, colorized movies are eligible for copyright if they "reveal a
certain minimum amount of individual creative human authorship
five years of film to convert-in the domestic market alone. COLOR SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY,
THE COMPANY 3 (1988) (informational statement about Color Systems Technology, Inc.)
(copy on file with the University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review). Even with
recent advances in technology, Color Systems has achieved only a 200 percent increase in
productivity.
Color Systems recently entered into a joint venture with Coca-Cola Telecommunica-
tions, Inc. to form Screen Gems Classicolor (Screen Gems). COLOR SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY,
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. Screen Gems will control a television and feature film
library worth over one-hundred million dollars. Color Systems will share in the profits from
the worldwide distribution of the library and will be paid by Screen Gems for colorizing
black and white footage. Color Systems also entered into an agreement with Trafalgar Hold-
ings, Ltd. to colorize over sixty public domain films-i.e., films upon which there is no copy-
right restriction. See infra note 16. Through this agreement, Color Systems will earn a mini-
mum of thirty-three million dollars over a three year period if all options are exercised. Id.
10. Notice of Registration Decision: Copyright Registration for Colorized Versions of
Black and White Motion Pictures, 52 Fed. Reg. 23,443 (1987) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §
202); Molotsky, Colored Movies Ruled Eligible for Copyright, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1987, at
9 (arts/entertainment). See also ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2. On August 9, 1988 the Copy-
right Office adopted a final deposit regulation. See Copyright Registration For Colorized
Versions Of Black And White Motion Pictures; Final Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 29,887, 29,887-890
(1988).




Kilgore: Colorization: Removing the Green
Published by Institutional Repository, 1989
90 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
and are produced by existing computer-coloring technology."'"
They are ineligible if only a few colors are added to an existing
black and white movie."
The criteria for determining eligibility for colorization copy-
right include: (1) Human beings must make numerous color selec-
tions from a large inventory of color; 4 (2) there must be more than
a trivial variation in the range and extent of color; (3) the coloriza-
tion must change the overall appearance of the movie; and (4) sim-
ply removing the color will not create eligibility.' 5
Colorizers whose films meet these criteria will receive a copy-
right in their derivative works, granting them potection against in-
fringement for life plus fifty years or, in some cases, up to seventy-
five years.'" They will have the right to distribute the work
through theatres, network television, and cable television, and to
sell or rent videotape copies."
12. Id. at col. 5.
13. Id.
14. See supra text accompanying note 3.
15. Id.
16. Davis, Computer-Colored Films Are Entitled To Copyright Protection, Agency
Rules, Wall St. J., June 22, 1987, at 30, col. 2. See also Molotsky, supra note 10. Most films
are works for hire and therefore are entitled to 75 years of protection from the year of first
publication under § 302(c). All other works automatically receive protection for life plus 50
years under the Act.
Copyrights may be renewed. If they are not, the copyrighted materials lapse into the
public domain and may be copied, exhibited, distributed, or otherwise reproduced without
the need to obtain permission of the artistic author, or to pay him royalties. It's A Wonder-
ful Life (RKO Radio Pictures 1946) is an example of a film that lapsed into the public
domain. Film Integrity Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 2400 Before the Subcomm. on Tech-
nology and the Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(statement of Rob Word, Senior Vice-President of Hal Roach Studios, Inc.), reprinted in
Colorization: The Arguments For, 17 J. ARTS MGMT. & L. 64, 72 (Fall, 1987) [hereinafter
Arguments For].
The proposed Film Protection Act, discussed infra notes 159-164 and accompanying
text, would have provided filmmakers with protection against undesired colorization even
after the lapse of copyright on the film. The proposed Act was silent as to whether its pro-
tections would have been available to films that never were copyrighted.
17. Davis, supra note 16; Molotsky, supra note 10 . This ruling is a major boost to the
Turner Entertainment Co., a division of Turner Broadcasting Systems Inc., which acquired
the entire MGM film library. Galbraith, Mayer Says TEC Won't Option Remake Rights To
MGM Library, Variety, Apr. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 2. Since acquiring this library of old movies,
Turner has been a leader in contracting to colorize black and white films. Id. The films then
are slated for broadcast on Turner Broadcasting Systems's cable television superstation
WTBS where millions of viewers see them. Significantly, because Turner owns the underly-
ing library of MGM films as well as the colorized versions, Turner would be free to refuse to
allow anyone to, or at least discourage anyone from, broadcasting, exhibiting, or otherwise
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B. General Arguments For and Against Colorization
The debate over colorization has become a pitched battle be-
tween artists and the colorizing entrepreneurs (colorizers).
Colorizers argue that there is a demand for colorized films. Arguing
that the public prefers color, they point to polls conducted by
Cable News Network and the Today show showing public support
for colorization. 18 In essence, colorizers argue that the market
should decide' 9 by choosing whether or not to watch and buy
colorized films.
20
It would seem that the public has decided in favor of colorized
films: revenues for the colorized version of Yankee Doodle Dandy
2'
were greater in the first six months of sales than in the previous
ten years of sales of the original black and white version.22
The artists respond that "[i]f members of the public had the
right to demand alterations to suit their taste, the world would
have no real art. '23 Great paintings would be repainted; novels and
music would be rewritten to suit present tastes.24 The artists argue
that efforts should be directed toward elevating the artistic appre-
ciation of the audience rather than trying to "doctor the film artifi-
cially to keep up with lowered tastes."2 5
The colorizers' strongest argument is that they do not destroy
the original black and white prints when colorizing a film. 26 The
first step in the process is to make a videotape print from the black
and white original.2 This means that the original black and white
18. Secunda, Is Movie Colorization A Moral Issue For Broadcasters?, Broadcasting,
May 25, 1987, at 20. The CNN call-in poll showed that more than 60% of the respondents
favored colorizing. Id.
19. Krauthammer, Casablanca in Color? I'm Shocked, Shocked!, TIME, Jan. 12, 1987,
at 82 (Essay).
20. Secunda, supra note 18; Krauthammer, supra note 19. Krauthammer responds to
film critic Gene Siskel's theory that colorizing should be proscribed ("It's a decision the
public shouldn't have to make."), by charging that the democratic solution is to let the
public decide. He compares Siskel's statement to something the Russian Minister of Culture
might have said. Id.
21. (Warner Bros. 1942)
22. Galbraith, supra note 17.




26. Krauthammer, supra note 19; COLOR SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY, THE PROCESS (1988)
(informational statement describing the colorization process) (copy on file with the Univer-
sity of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review).
27. Krauthammer, supra note 19; COLOR SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY, THE PROCESS, supra
note 26. The colorizers argue that, far from having reckless disregard for black and white
films, they actually have restored and preserved many old black and white prints that have
1989]
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print is always available.28
At present, artists and others who oppose colorization have
one very strong argument: the process currently produces a prod-
uct that looks artificially colored rather than naturally colored. It
is therefore generally unsatisfactory. "[I]n the colorized version of
Night of the Living Dead2" the sky, the woman's dress, the tomb-
stones and the shirts on both men were all matching violet ... .
[Colorizing] starts not with a blank sheet as a color film does,
but with a sheet that is already colored black and white, so
[colorizers have] got to find colors they can lay on top so they
will show up. So they tend to pick ... light blues, light greens,
pinks, violets, yellows .. . ."
However, as the process is improved, the quality will be less open
to attack.
Perhaps the best argument, and the more enduring one, is that
black and white photography "is not better or worse in general,
but [that] it is different." 2 Black and white movies are "not [sim-
ply] color photography with the color removed."33 The techniques
involved in making black and white movies are completely differ-
ent from those for color movies.34 Because the only colors the di-
deteriorated badly.
The first thing we did was discover in the vaults [of Hal Roach Studios] all the
films that were deteriorating .... These movies were filmed on combustible
nitrate stock.... There has been no economic reason, up until recently, to pre-
serve those films .... The conversion of black and white to color has suddenly
providied companies with an economic incentive to restore these films.
Arguments For, supra note 16, at 70-71 (statement of Rob Word, Senior Vice-President of
Hal Roach Studios, Inc.).
28. Hack, TeleVisions, Hollywood Reporter, Apr. 28, 1987.
The market for the original black and white print does not remain untouched, however:
"The only difference is now, if you want to see the original, the price has gone up." Id.
(quoting Charles Powell, Executive Vice-President of Color Systems Technology).
For viewers or exhibitors unwilling to pay for the black and white print, colorizers ad-
vise them simply to turn down the color on the television to watch the film in black and
white. Krauthammer, supra note 19. But see Collidge, Letters: A Dissent And An Answer
About Colorizing, Director's Guild of America, The Newsletter, Apr. 1987. Many newer
color sets do not have a color control knob; for those that do, certain added colors have a
density that leaves a blurry shadow even after the color is turned down. Id. Therefore, turn-
ing off the color on a colorized print does not present a suitable alternative to the original
black and white version.
29. (Image Ten 1968)
30. R. Ebert, Siskel & Ebert, supra note 1.
31. Id.
32. Arguments Against, supra note 6, at 85 (emphasis in original) (statement of film
director Sidney Pollack).
33. Id. at 92 (statement of film director Elliot Silverstein).
34. Id.
6
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rector has to work with are black, white, and infinite shadings of
grey, shadow and the relationship between light space and dark-
ness become important elements of the film. As a result of coloriza-
tion then, integral portions of the artistic value of the film such as
the use of lighting design and shadow to create a mood or express
an element of the story can be lost.3 5 Does the artist have any legal
right to protect the integrity of his creation?
II. MORAL RIGHTS
The doctrine of copyright under United States law generally
grants protection to the creator of artistic work who registers the
work with the Office of the Register of Copyrights. 6 Copyright
protection is a patrimonial, or property, right.3 7 Copyright protec-
tion prevents anyone from copying, exhibiting, distributing, or oth-
erwise reproducing the work without permission of the copyright
owner."' Similar protections are available under the laws of many
other countries.39 United States copyright law does not recognize
any right beyond the patrimonial rights-specifically, American
law does not recognize moral rights.40
35. One director has said:
If I had portrayed New York City in color rather than black and white in my
movie Manhattan, all the nostalgic connotations would have vanished.... If I
had filmed Annie Hall in black and white, all the scenes that now come off
amusingly would take a giant step toward grim seriousness by mere virtue of
them [sic] suddenly being grittier and less cartoonlike.
Arguments Against, supra note 6, at 87 (statement of film director and actor Woody Allen).
Obviously, then, the change introduced by colorizers can change the original film
substantially.
The colorizers point out that the directors themselves have altered the works of play-
wrights and novelists when converting their works into movies. Blum, Emotion Pictures,
THE NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 9, 1987. Frank Capra bought the story It's A Wonderful Life,
along with three unsuccessful screenplays, and then rewrote them combining the four for
the final film version. The ending of the movie Little Shop of Horrors was changed from the
play because it was considered too depressing for preview audiences. Id. The artists respond
that "a film is a new work, only based on a writer's work." Id. They argue that the reputa-
tion of a playwright or a novelist, as an artist, is not affected. Rosenfeld, The Color Guard,
Washington Post, May 13, 1987, at F1, col. 2. In contrast, the colorization of a movie is an
alteration of a present work and, consequently, colorization damages the reputation of the
writer and director.
36. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
37. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1025
(1976).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). This restriction applies usually to reproductions for profit.
The copyright law recognizes exceptions for educational and other similar uses. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 107-118 (1982).
39. E.g. France, Germany, and Italy. See Merryman, supra note 37, at 1025.
40. See generally Merryman, supra note 37.
1989]
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Moral rights protect the honor and reputation of the artist4'
from the presentation to the public of a deformed version of his
work.42 Moral rights include the creator's right to prevent his work
from being deformed or mutilated, to be acknowledged as the crea-
tor of his work, to prevent others from being credited with his
work, to prevent being acknowledged as the creator of work not his
own, to withdraw a published work if it no longer represents his
views, and to prevent the use of his work or name in such a way as
to reflect on his professional standing.4"
This doctrine protects the personal rights of the artist as dis-
tinguished from economic rights.44 Moral rights are "an element of
the author's personality rather than a property right.
45
The moral rights doctrine protects the rights of the creators
and the public over those of the entrepreneurs and the perform-
ers.46 The moral rights of the performer also are protected to the
extent that he is a creator; but, given a direct conflict between the
rights of the creator and the rights of one performing that creator's
work, the creator's rights must be paramount, 47 for it is the crea-
tion of the original work which gives the performer a vehicle in
which to display his talents. 48 If a work is to be modified, the art-
ist's moral rights are implicated.
The issue of who has the burden of extracting an agreement
relating to the right to modify a work varies between Europe and
the United States.49 In France and Italy the burden is on the pur-
chaser; any modification not only must be reasonable, but also the
artist must have agreed to the specific proposed modification.50 A
less protective position is found in the Berne Convention and
41. Moral rights accorded to the artists by implication also are accorded to film direc-
tors. This is so even though filmmaking is a collaborative process, unlike other art forms
such as writing, painting, sculpting, or composing, in which one envisions a lone artist work-
ing in his studio, perhaps by candlelight in the dark of night. Often, several hundred people
are involved in the production of a film. "Under the auteur theory of film making, the
director is the primary artist. The completed film is ascribed to the director, and he is re-
sponsible for its artistic successes and failures." Greenstone, A Coat of Paint on the Past?,
ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 1986, at 24 n.80. Therefore, it is the director who may consent to
make changes. 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 8.21(a), at 8-247, 8-249 (1986).
42. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 569 (1940).
43. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, at 8-247.
44. Id.
45. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 41.
46. Id.
47. Roeder, supra note 42, at 577-78.
48. Roeder, supra note 42, at 578.
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under German law: the purchaser has the burden of obtaining the
creator's consent to modify, though the artist does not have to give
approval to specific modifications. 1
In the United States the burden traditionally has been on the
artist to extract an agreement on modification permission from the
purchaser.52 If the artist failed to secure an agreement, he will have
no right to govern the fate of his work. Over the last few decades
there has been a movement in the courts towards a requirement of
reasonableness in the modification,5" and one court has accorded
full copyright status to the author's right to prevent distortion or
excessive editing of his work. 54 Overall, however, some critics be-
lieve American law on the subject is still sorely lacking. One has
said, "Little can be said in favor of the United States rule....
A. Moral Rights in Europe
The doctrine of moral rights developed in Europe over several
centuries.56 It is considered most important in France, Germany,
and Italy.57 In the latter half of the nineteenth century the French
civil courts expanded the doctrine to include the right to prevent
deformation of the artist's work. 8
This doctrine was partially adopted in 1928 at the Berne Con-
vention, as revised in Rome, Article 6 bis59 as follows:
(1) Independently of the patrimonial rights of the author and
even after the assignment of the said rights, the author retains
the right to claim the paternity of work, as well as the right to
object to every deformation, mutilation or other modification of
the said work, which may be prejudicial to his honor or to his
reputation.
(2) It is left to the national legislation of each of the countries of
the Union to establish the conditions for the exercise of these
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 398, (N.Y.
Sup. Ct.), af'd, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 872 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829
(N.Y. App. Div. 1966); Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755 (Cal.
Super. Ct.), aff'd, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 572 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1966); Autry v. Republic Prods.,
Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954).
54. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). See infra notes
87-130 and accompanying text.
55. Merryman, supra note 37, at 1045.
56. Roeder, supra note 42, at 555.
57. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, at 8-247 n.1.
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rights. The means for safeguarding them shall be regulated by
the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.6 0
The Berne Convention governs the Union for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works (Union) 1 Although the United States
became a signatory to the Berne Convention in 1988, the provi-
sions relating to moral rights is not in force for the United States. 2
In most European countries the moral right is perpetual; not
even heirs of a deceased artist can change his work. 3 In fact, the
moral right continues even if no heirs exist.6 '
The European countries' recognition of moral rights arises
from their acknowledgement that society has several interests in
preventing undesired alterations.6 5 One interest is the public's de-
sire to see the authentic work as the artist intended it, not a dis-
torted version.66 A second interest is in the preserving of art as
part of culture and history.6 7 To alter the artist's work is to "falsify
a piece of culture."6 " Society has a responsibility to pass on these
works to the next generation. "[W]e should not break ... into the
future by greedily devouring-in fact, cannibalizing-our own
past.""0
60. Id.
61. Id. at 557.
62. The United States has taken the position that the Convention is not self-execut-
ing; Congress, therefore, passsed the Berne Convention Implementation Act (BCIA) of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (Oct. 31, 1988) to give the treaty the force of law in the
United States. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, at Berne Convention Implementation Act of
1988 Supplement. The BCIA specifically left off the list of Berne provisions enacted as law
article 6 bis. Id. In fact, the Act specifically stated, "The adherence of the United States to
the Berne Convention and passage of new law 'do not expand or reduce any right of an
author' to assert moral rights in any copyrightable work." Berne Convention Implementa-
tion Act, § 3(b), supra, quoted in 1 M. NIrMMER, supra note 41, at Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988.
In March of 1989, the Office of the Register of Copyrights recommended that the Con-
gress consider a unified federal system of moral rights protection. The model used in devel-
oping this position was the effect upon existing films' copyrights of new technologies includ-
ing colorization. Technological Alteration To Motion Pictures And Other Audiovisual
Works: Implications For Creators Copyright Owners, And Consumers, A Report Of The
Register Of Copyrights (March 1989) (copy on file with the University of Miami Entertain-
ment & Sports Law Review).






69. Arguments Against, supra note 6, at 92 (statement of film director Elliot Silver-
stein) (commenting that black and white films must be allowed to stand unaltered as a
legacy of the black and white era in filmmaking and as cultural symbols).
70. Id.
10
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B. Moral Rights in the United States
Despite these sound policy reasons, several courts have stated
that moral rights are not recognized in the United States.71 In Gei-
sel v. Poynter Products, Inc. 72 the court stated "[t]he doctrine of
moral right is not part of the law in the United States... except
insofar as parts of that doctrine exist in our law as specific rights..
" 2973 In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.74 the
court held that the "American copyright law, as presently written,
does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for
their violation since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather
than the personal rights of authors. ' 75 However, case law in the
United States has recognized some of the substance of moral rights
in the guise of the doctrines of unfair competition, defamation, in-
vasion of privacy, and breach of contract.76 And, some courts have
prohibited editing of films on grounds other than moral rights to
protect the director's creation.77
C. The Moral Right to Prevent Deformation and Unfair
Competition
The right to prevent deformation is the oldest and best known
of the moral rights.78 It often is regarded as composing the entire
doctrine.
7 9
71. See, e.g., Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755 (Cal.
Super. Ct.), aff'd, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 572 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1966); Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
72. 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
73. Id. at 339 n.5. The plaintiff Geisel is better known by his nom de plume Dr. Seuss.
In the 1930s, he prepared a series of illustrations with accompanying text for Liberty Maga-
zine. Some thirty years later, defendants manufactured dolls based on the characters Geisel
drew in the Dr. Seuss illustrations. He sued, claiming that the dolls were "tasteless, unat-
tractive and of inferior quality." Id. at 333 (quoting Plaintiff's Complaint at 1 41 and 23).
He pleaded violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1982); unfair competition;
violation of his right to privacy; and tortious conspiracy to injure him. The Geisel court held
that none of these theories were applicable to Geisel's particluar claim. Therefore, because
there was no other available right in United States law, and because moral rights are not
recognized in the United States, Geisel was not entitled to either damages or an injunction.
Geisel's allegations sound strikingly similar to the charges leveled against colorizers by
film directors. A case in which colorizing destroyed the character of a film would present a
court today with the opportunity to depart from the result in Geisel and, perhaps, recognize
moral rights.
74. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
75. Id.
76. M. NIMMER, supra note 41, at 8-248.
77. Greenstone, supra, note 41 at 18.




Kilgore: Colorization: Removing the Green
Published by Institutional Repository, 1989
98 ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
American courts have recognized under another name the
right to prevent deformation. In Prouty v. National Broadcasting
Co., Inc.,80 the author of the novel Stella Dallas brought suit when
her character was used by the defendant in broadcasts "of inferior
artistic and commercial quality."8' The court held that this por-
trayal was damaging to the plaintiff's reputation and could come
within the tort of unfair competition in the guise of passing off
defendant's work as that of the plaintiff, at once both capitalizing
on the plaintiff's name and injuring it.
Though this right applies to the creator's name and reputa-
tion, it does not apply to the destruction of the artist's work.8 2 In
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church,83 the artist did a fresco
painting for a church. He agreed to obtain and assign a copyright
to the church. Eight years later the church redecorated, painting
over the fresco without Crimi's consent. The court held that al-
though the mural legally could not be mutilated, the law would not
object to its being destroyed.8 This seemingly inconsistent result
reflects the policy concern of the doctrine of deformation: the basis
of the right to prevent deformation of the artist's work is to pro-
tect his honor and reputation from being damaged by having work
that is not his own attributed to him in the eyes of the public.85 If
the work is destroyed, there is no possibility that the public will
mistake it for the creator's work.8 6
The courts have not articulated a uniform standard as to what
actually constitutes deformation. In Granz v. Harris,7 Judge
Frank in his concurring opinion stated that "[w]hether the work is
copyrighted or not, the established rule is that, even if the contract
with the artist had expressly authorized reasonable modifications.
. . it is an actionable wrong to hold out the artist as author of a
version which substantially departs from the original."8 8 Judge
80. 26 F. Supp 265 (D. Mass 1939).
81. Id. at 266.
82. Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," AM. J. COMP. L.,
487, 498 (1968); Roeder, supra note 42, at 569.
83. 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949).
84. Id. at 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 813; Treece, supra note 82.
85. Roeder, supra note 42, at 569.
86. Id. Of course, this seems to answer only part of the question. Another identified
policy of the doctrine of moral rights is to preserve art as part of culture and history. See
supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text. Clearly, this policy goal is not served by a rule
that allows destruction of the work without penalty. The Crimi rule therefore seems
imprudent.
87. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
88. Id. at 589 (Frank, J., concurring).
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Frank's concurrence is often cited for the proposition that to do so
would be a form of unfair competition. 9
In Autry v. Republic Productions," actor Gene Autry sought
to prevent the editing of his films for television." Autry had signed
a contract giving the producer the sole and exclusive right to ex-
ploit the character he portrayed.92 In holding for the producer, the
court noted that the film was only reduced by approximately seven
minutes for each hour of broadcasting, which indicated that the
edits did not work a substantial change in the film.9 3 However, the
court went on to state that "we can conceive that some such cut-
ting and editing could result in emasculating the motion pictures
so that they would no longer contain substantially the same emo-
tion and dynamic and dramatic qualities which it was the purpose
of the artist's employment to produce."94 The court did not define
"substantially" and stated that it would leave open the question of
emasculation.
9 5
A California Superior court attempted to define "substan-
tially" in Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co.96 Producer/direc-
tor George Stevens brought an action under the theory of unfair
competition against NBC to prevent commercial interruptions of
his film A Place in the SunY' The court stated that the manner in
which the commercials were inserted could result in emasculation
of the movie. 8 The court enjoined the defendants from editing the
movie in a manner that would "so alter, adversely affect or emas-
culate the artistic or pictorial quality of said motion picture so as
to destroy or distort materially or substantially the mood, effect, or
continuity of said motion picture as produced and directed by the
plaintiff."9 Under this court's holding, a film is emasculated if the
mood, the effect, or the continuity is altered.
In Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp.,00 producer/director
89. Id.
90. 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954).
91. Id. at 668.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 669.
95. Id. at 670.
96. 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755 (Cal. Super. Ct.), aff'd, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 572 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1966).
97. Id. at 758.
98. Id. at 755. NBC wanted to insert some thirty to fifty commercials throughout the
film.
99. Id. at 758.
100. 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), af'd, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 872
(N.Y. App. Div. 1966), alf'd, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
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Otto Preminger brought an action to prevent his movie Anatomy
of a Murder' from being edited for television. 102 The court first
determined that Preminger's contract with Columbia, which gave
him final cutting and editing rights, did not include television ver-
sions of the film. 03 The court then stated: "We begin with the pro-
position that the law is not so rigid, even in the absence of con-
tract, as to leave a party without protection against publication of
the garbled version of his work."' 1 4 In this case, the court held that
minor cuts were the industry standard and not a mutilation of the
work. 0 5 There was no evidence that the proposed editing for the
insertion of commercials would affect the story line.106 The court
did state that "excessive cutting" could be mutilation of the
movie. 10 Under the standard set by this New York court excessive
cutting could be mutilation where the story line is affected.
This Comment next analyzes whether an artist whose film is
colorized, efecting a substantial change, can object to the
colorization.
1. When the Artist Has Consented to Modification
Once the artist has granted the authority to alter his work, he
is bound, as are his successors in interest. 08 This authority should
be non-transferable unless expressly agreed to by the artist.109
These powers to modify should not be unlimited. The intrinsic
aesthetic quality of the work should not be altered; for example, a
tragedy should not be made into a comedy."0
Several cases in the United States have limited this power to
modify. In Granz v. Harris,"' the court stated that "[w]hether the
work is copyrighted or not, the established rule is that even if the
contract with the artist had expressly authorized reasonable modi-
fications, . . . it is an actionable wrong to hold out the artist as
101. (Columbia 1959)
102. Id. at 398-99.
103. Id. at 400. The practice of permitting a director to produce a final edited version,
or "director's cut" which reflects his unadulterated artistic vision of his film, is common in
the industry. Arguments Against, supra note 6, at 89 (statement of film director Elliot
Silverstein).
104. Id. (citing Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 589 (Frank, J., concurring)).
105. Id. at 401.
106. Id. at 400.
107. Id. at 402.
108. Roeder, supra note 42, at 571.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
[Vol. 6:87
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author of a version which substantially departs from the origi-
nal."'12 In Autry v. Republic Productions,113 where the actor and
producer had entered into a contract giving the producer sole and
exclusive rights," 4 the court stated that it recognized there could
be a circumstance in which the motion picture could be emascu-
lated by cutting and editing that substanatially effects the motion,
dynamic, and dramatic qualities of a motion picture. In Preminger
v. Columbia Pictures Corp.115 the court held that although the film
was not mutilated by minor editing,'16 "excessive cutting" could be
mutilation.
117
In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc,'" the
Second Circuit raised excessive modification to the level of copy-
right infringement."' The court found "that unauthorized editing
of the underlying work, if proven, would constitute an infringe-
ment of the copyright in that work similar to any other use of a
work that exceeded the license granted by the proprietor of the
copyright."' 20
The colorization of a movie may be compared to the mutila-
tion caused by editing.' 2 ' Of course, both acts are committed to
increase the marketability of the movie. 2 The editing is generally
done to incorporate commercials and, therefore, increase reve-
nues. 2 3 Similarly, the colorizers hope to increase the popularity of
the movie and, consequently, increase sales. 24 Despite this seem-
ingly noble goal, the method the colorizers use may be detrimental
to the film, particularly where the mood and artistic quality of the
film are destroyed by the addition of color. For this reason,
112. Id. at 589 (Frank, J., concurring).
113. 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954).
114. Id. at 668. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
115. 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), afl'd. 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 872 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1966), affd, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
116. Id. at 401.
117. Id. at 402.
118. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
119. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, at 8-249. The court also found that this was unfair
competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), because there was injury to
plaintiff's name, see infra notes 149 & 150, even though there was no competition between
the parties. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24, construed in H.B. Halicki v. United Artists Communi-
cations, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987).
120. 538 F.2d at 21. See also WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, 693
F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982) ("[U]nauthorized editing of the underlying work ... would consti-
tute an infringement of the copyright .....
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colorization is akin to editing brought to the level of mutilation. As
a consequence, even where a filmmaker has agreed through con-
tract to allow modification, unless he has expressly agreed to allow
colorization, the contract must be interpreted to prohibit it.
2. When The Contract Is Silent As To Modification
If the contract is silent as to modification, the question arises
whether the purchaser must obtain the permission of the artist to
modify the work. In Gilliam,2 5 the British comedy group Monty
Python brought suit to enjoin the broadcast of a severely edited
version of their work.126 The court held that "[s]ince the script-
writer's agreement explicitly retains for the group all rights not
granted by the contract, omission of any terms concerning altera-
tions in the program after recording must be read as reserving to
appellants exclusive authority for such revisions.' 2 By this hold-
ing, the court assumed that "such rights must reside in the au-
thors."'1 28 The court reasoned that, unless the artist has expressly
authorized the changes, the grantee cannot materially alter the
work from the form in which it was created by the artist.129 In
those situations where the writer or director still has a copyright in
the film, and has not expressly authorized the colorization, he may
claim that the right to allow colorization resides with him alone. 30
3. When The Artist No Longer Has Rights To The Work
Directors and writers who no longer are protected by copy-
right may argue that the colorization of their films is a mutilation
which constitutes the tort of unfair competition. The moral rights
that would be protected under this theory would be the artist's
125. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
126. Id. Twenty-four of the original ninety minutes were deleted. Id. at 18. The de-
leted portions were thought to be too strong or too raunchy for American audiences. Gilliam
argued that this material was representative of the character of the Monty Python troupe.
The broadcast was to be American audiences' first exposure to the British comedy group,
and Gilliam argued that, as first impressions often determine whether an audience will cot-
ton to a performer, the excessive edits of some of Python's best material would forever
deprive Python of the opportunity to win over much of its American target audience. See
infra notes 146-155 and accompanying text.
127. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 22.
128. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, at 8-251.
129. Id. at 8-252.
130. On the other hand, if the contract specifically reserves only the specified rights,
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right to prevent his work from being deformed or mutilated,' and
the right to prevent the use of his work or name in such a way as
to reflect on his professional standing.
The artist may have a cause of action under the tort of unfair
competition when the mutilation of his work damages his reputa-
tion. 32 In Prouty,' the court held that the defendant's appropria-
tion of characters known to the public as having been created by
the plaintiff for use in an "inferior grade" radio program consti-
tuted unfair competition.3 4 The court went on to state that unfair
competition was "'only a convenient name for the doctrine that no
one should be allowed to sell his goods as those of another.' ,u
In Preminger,3 6 the court stated: "We begin with the proposi-
tion that the law is not so rigid, even in the absence of contract, as
to leave a party without protection against publication of the gar-
bled version of his work.'
3
Under the tort of unfair competition, the writer or director of
a colorized film may claim that his reputation is being damaged by
the use of colorization which mutilates his work by making it dif-
ferent from the original work. Where the mutilated work is accom-
panied by the artist's name, the strongest argument may be that
there is a misrepresentation under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.33 The Act reads in part:
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connec-
tion with any goods or services, or any containers for foods, a
false designation of origin, or any false description or represen-
tation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to de-
scribe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or ser-
vices to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with
knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin of descrip-
tion or representation cause or procure the same to be trans-
ported or used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to
be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action by any
131. The right to prevent deformation and mutilation is the French moral right most
likely to develop in the United States. Id.
132. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, at 8-253.
133. Prouty v. NBC, 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass 1939). See supra notes 80-82 and ac-
companying text.
134. Id. at 266.
135. Id. (quoting Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924)).
136. Preminger v. Colombia Pictures Corp., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.),
af'd, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 872 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 829 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1966). See supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
137. 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 400.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (1982).
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person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of
origin or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by
any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by
the use of any such false description or representation.'
In Metric & Multistandard Components Corp. v. Metrics,
Inc.,4 ' the court stated that the Lanham Act is a federal remedy
"for the particular kind of unfair competition which results from
false designation of origin or other false representation used in
connection with the sale of a product."''
The Autry 42 court held that there is no cause of action under
the Lanham Trade-Mark Act where the plaintiff has consented to
the alteration.
The court in Jaeger v. American International Pictures,
Inc.143 considered the application of the Lanham Act to a suit in-
volving a mutilated and garbled film. The plaintiff claimed that
major parts of the movie had been cut and that a twenty-five min-
ute segment had been inserted causing a "gross distortion and mu-
tilation of the original screenplay."' 44 The court denied a motion to
dismiss, holding that "[ilt is at least arguable that there is a claim
under the Lanham Act.. . in the charge that defendant represents
to the public that what the plaintiff had nothing to do with is the
plaintiff's product ....
In Gilliam,'46 the court held that even if the action does not
involve a registered trademark, the Lanham Act may be used to
prevent injury to the plaintiff's business or personal reputation
from misrepresentations.' 7 The court stated that "[ilt is sufficient
139. Id.
140. 635 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff Metric & Multistandard sued Metrics, Inc.
for violations of the Lanham Act arising from Metrics, Inc.'s production of a catalogue for
its metric industrial supplies. The catalogue was assembled by cutting and pasting portions
of plaintiff's catalogue, using typefaces that were the same as those used by plaintiff, and
binding the catalogue so that the spine read "Metric's," just as plaintiff's read "Metric." Id.
at 712. Not surprisingly, the verdict was for plaintiff: consumers were confused as to which
company they were dealing.
141. Id. at 713.
142. Autry v. Republic Productions, 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954).
143. 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Plaintiff Jaeger was a principal in a German
film company that produced the film Kamasutra-Perfection of Love. Plaintiff alleged that
American distributors substantially edited the film, removing some 16 minutes of the origi-
nal film and splicing in nearly 25 minutes of explicit erotic material. Id. at 275, 278. The
court held the plaintiff stated a cause of action for unfair competition.
144. Id. at 275.
145. Id. at 278.
146. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
147. Id. at 24.
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to violate the Act that a representation of a product although tech-
nically true, creates a false impression of the product's origin.
1 48
The Gilliam court found that the extreme editing of the pro-
gram would inflict serious injury on the plaintiff's professional rep-
utation.149 Because this was the plaintiff's first broadcast before a
nationwide audience in this country, the court determined that the
editing could have damaged the Monty Python troupe's opportu-
nity to develop the large following necessary for its success. 5 The
court ordered that the defendant be enjoined from showing the ed-
ited version.
51
Significantly, the Gilliam court also stated that a disclaimer of
the plaintiff's approval of the edited version would not be sufficient
to remedy the harm done. 52 The court did not believe that the
disclaimer would effectively contradict the impression the edited
film would leave on the viewer.' 53 The court also pointed out that
the viewer might tune in late and miss the disclaimer.'54 It is for
these same reasons that a director would be able to state a claim
when his film is colorized.
Even where the artist's name is not used directly, he still may
be able to state a cause of action under the Lanham Act. 55 The
148. Id.
149. Id. at 19.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 26.
152. Id. at 25 n.13.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. One of the most recent decisions construing the Lanham Act would seem, at first
blush, to throw a roadblock into the path of a director using this theory. In H. B. Halicki v.
United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1987), the court held that for
the plaintiff to maintain an action under the Lanham Act he must show not only that the
conduct was unfair, but also that it was competitive. Id. at 1214. Plaintiff Halicki produced
the film The Junkman and tailored it with numerous car chases and collisions to appeal to a
teenage audience. Plaintiff alleged that in his distribution agreement with defendants, all
defendants agreed to market the film under the PG rating which the film had been awarded.
However, the defendants marketed the film as an R movie. Most of the audience that
Halicki intended to attract could not be admitted into the R film. As a result, the film was a
box office disaster.
Upon closer examination, Halicki is distinguishable on two grounds. First, the court
found that the plaintiff probably was adequately served by a breach of contract claim. Id. at
1215. The court specifically distinguished between Gilliam-type situations and the circum-
stance before it in Halicki: defendants in Gilliam had engaged in passing off, or creating a
false impression as to the film's origin, not present in Halicki. Id. at 1214. In the case of
colorized films, the distributors of colorized films still are marketing their films as the origi-
nal films; they are merely in color. As this Comment noted supra notes 5-8 and 29-35 and
accompanying text, the film can be changed substantially by the addition of color, just as
Gilliam's Monty Python film was changed by editing out material that was the hallmark of
the group's humor. Consequently, an argument can be made for passing off.
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artist may argue that selling the movie after his or her name has
been implied is reverse passing off. This occurs when the wrong-
doer removes the name of the source and sells it in an unbranded
state. 5 ' In making his case, the artist would point out that "an
author who sells his work still has a right to have his name on it
unless the contract of sale specifically gives the publisher un-
restricted rights to change the name." Once the artist establishes
that his or her name must be on the work, then the artist may
argue that the colorization is a misrepresentation under the Lan-
ham Act. When the film is so unique as to be easily identifiable as
the work of a particular artist,1 7 the artist also may claim injury
based on a false representation. 158 In those situations where the
name of the writer or director is used, or the work is easily identifi-
able as to its creator, the artist may use the Lanham Act, claiming
that the mutilation of the film by the addition of color creates a
false impression of the movie's origin and could damage his busi-
ness or personal reputation.
III. THE PROPOSED STATUTORY RIGHT
The proposed federal Film Integrity Act of 19871"9 would have
provided the greatest protection against colorization. This bill
would have prohibited the material alteration of a film, including
colorization, after the film had been published, without the written
consent of the "artistic authors."' 60 The bill defined "artistic au-
thors" as the principal director and principal screenwriter of the
work.'6
The bill further stated that the artistic author could assign the
right of consent only to another qualified artistic author. In the
event of death or disability, the right of consent could be trans-
ferred to a qualified artistic author. The bill also would have pro-
tected the films of those artistic authors who were deceased on the
156. Cf. Smith v. Montor, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff, actor Paul Smith,
sued distributors of the film Convoy Buddies, in which he starred, beacuse they removed his
name from the credits and advertisements for the film, and substituted the name of Bob
Spencer, another actor; the court held that plaintiff stated a cause of action for express
reverse passing off, violating Lanham's prohibition on the use of false designation of origin,
false representation, and false descriptions).
157. Roeder, supra note 42, at 569.
158. See Prouty v. NBC, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939). See supra notes 80 &
81 and accompanying text.
159. H.R. 2400, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (introduced by Representative
Gephardt).
160. Id. at 2.
161. Id. at 3.
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effective date of the bill by stating that a successor or heir may
assign the right "only to a third party who is a qualified artistic
author.''162 Only a qualified artist would be able to exercise the
right of consent.'
Further, the artistic author would have been protected against
expiration of the copyright. The bill stated that the right of con-
sent "shall not expire when the copyright expires ...., One of
the bill's greatest weaknesses however, was that it was silent as to
whether it would provide protection to films that never had been
copyrighted. This weakness points to the need for the United
States to adopt the doctrine of moral rights forthright, rather than
trying to accomplish its goal under other names, where the rights
are bound by the constraints of other, perhaps inappropriate, doc-
trines as is the case when an artist suing under unfair competition
doctrines may have to show that he is in actual competition with
those he is suing.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision faced by Congress in dealing with the Film Integ-
rity Act of 1987 was whether the United States would recognize
the moral rights of the film artist. As this Comment has pointed
out, the only protection now afforded the artist is in those in-
stances when the artist can show economic damage by means of
copyright infringment, unfair competition, or the like. Through the
case law in the United States, the substance of moral rights has
been recognized under the doctrines of unfair competition, defa-
mation, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract.'65 This is not
enough. The law also must protect the artist against non-economic
damages, such as the destruction of the impact and integrity of his
work, if not the work itself.
James Thurber once said, "A nation in which a congressman
can seriously ask, 'Do you think the artist is a special person?' is a
nation living in cultural jeopardy."' 66 In failing to pass the Film
162. Id. at 2.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 3.
165. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 41, at 8-248.
166. L. PETER, PMR'S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OUR TIME (1980).
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Integrity Act, and in failing to adopt the Berne Convention's moral
rights provision, Congress answered Thurber's question with a re-
sounding "no".
Richard T. Kilgore*
* J.D., 1988, University of Miami School of Law. The author presently practices ap-
pellate law with Conroy, Simberg & Lewis, P.A. in Hollywood, Florida.
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